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Transfers of convicted offenders have recently begun under
United States treaties with Mexico' and Canada. 2 Both treaties
were ratified by the Senate in July, 1977, and implementing legislation was enacted on October 28, 1977.' The treaties represent
pioneering efforts in international penal cooporation, and like all
such efforts they pose novel operational and constitutional challenges. This article will outline the transfer procedures and highlight some substantive constitutional issues.

I.

RATIONALE OF THE TREATIES

The two treaties are comparable in most respects. The purpose of the treaties and of the implementing legislation is to permit
* Professor of Law, DePaul University; Secretary-General, International Association of Penal Law; Dean, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences (Siracusa, Italy). The assistance of Daniel Derby (J.D., DePaul University, 1978) is acknowledged.
1. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United StatesMexico, S. ExEc. Doc. D, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin H.R. Rnr. No. 720,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 13 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mexican Treaty]; see 77
DEP'T ST. BuLL. 758 (1977).
2. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, March 2, 1977, United StatesCanada, S. Exac. Doc. H, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 720,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Treaty].
3. Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-144, 91 Stat. 1212 (to be codified in 18
U.S.C. §§ 4100-4115, and other sections in 10, 18, 28 U.S.C.).
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persons convicted of crimes in a foreign state to. complete their sentences in their national state. The assumptions upon which the
treaties are founded include:
1. That a state has an interest in the treatment of its
citizens abroad;4
2. That a state has an interest in the future behavior of

its citizens;5

4. Nationality of individuals has formed the basis of two theories of jurisdiction under international law. See M. CHERiF BAssIouN, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADiTION AND WORLD PUBuC ORDER 251-59 (1974). On the protection of human rights
and humanitarian doctrine, see American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S. TREATY S. No. 36, at 1-21; European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(1955); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948);
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS,
§ 1, Doc. 1 (7th ed. Strasbourg 1971).
Concern over treatment of nationals abroad, even when subject to jurisdiction
of a foreign court, has been qualifiedly recognized in judicial decisions. In Gallina
v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960), the court
said:
[W]e have discovered that no case authorizing a federal court, in a habeas
corpus proceeding challenging extradition from the United States to a foreign nation, to inquire into the procedures which await the relator upon
extradition . . . . Nevertheless, we confess to some disquiet at this result.
We can imagine situations when the relator, upon extradition, would be
subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's
sense of decency as to require reexamination of the principle set out above.
278 F.2d at 78-79. Gallina had been tried and convicted in absentiaby the Italian
courts for robbery, and contended that if extradited, he would be imprisoned with
no opportunity for retrial. Accord, Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3489 (1977) ("A denial of extradition by the
Executive may be appropriate when strong humanitarian grounds are present
. . . when it appears that, if extradited, the individual will be persecuted, not
prosecuted, or subjected to grave injustice.") See M. CHERIF BAssIouNI, supra, at
530-31.
5. Rehabilitation is the principle of modem theories of criminal sanctions,
recognized by all states in the United States and most countries of the world. See,
e.g., M. CHERIF BAssiouM, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 76-106 (1978); L. ORLAND,
JUDGMENT, PUNISHMENT, MHECORRECTIONAL PROCESS (1977); and REPORT TO THE
FIFTH U.N. CONGRESS ON CRIME PREVENTION, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 1-12
(Geneva, Sept. 1975).
The importance of the rehabilitative process to the state whose nationality an
offender holds arises from the general practice of returning foreign offenders to
the state of their nationality once their sentences are completed. For an historical
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3. That states have a common interest in preventing
and suppressing criminality.'
The first consideration emphasizes the humanitarian nature
of the scheme in alleviating the hardships of serving foreign jail
sentences and the accompanying personal hardship to the offender and his or her family. The second consideration recognizes
that rehabilitation is largely a matter of resocialization, and therefore the social context in which it is attempted has a crucial bearing on the likelihood of its success. Moreover, this consideration
recognizes that supervised custody other than imprisonment in an
alien environment can be rendered ineffective for a variety of obvious reasons. Thus, permitting offenders to serve their sentences
in the state of their nationality will enhance the chances for successful socialization, a matter of particular importance to the
states to which offenders will eventually return. The third consideration is no mere truism; the treatment of offenders, including
basis of rehabilitation see J. BENTm, PmNCIPLES OF PENAL LAW, pt. 11, Bk. J.,
Chapter 6 (E. Browning ed. 1943). See also Fitzgerald, The TerritorialPrinciples
in Penal Law: An Attempted Justification, 1 GA. J. INT'L & CoM. L. 29 (1970).
6. For articles considering international cooperation in criminal matters, see
Grutzner, InternationalJudicialAssistance and Cooperationin CriminalMatters
in 2 M. CHERIF BASSiOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

189 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TREATISE]; Harari, McLean & Silverwood,
Reciprocal Enforcement of Criminal Judgments, 45 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE
DRorr PENAL 585 (1974); Oehler, Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgments and
their Enforcement, in 2 TREATISE, supra, at 261; Shearer, Recognition and EnLAW

forcement of Foreign CriminalJudgments, 47 AusT. L. J. 585 (1973).
For the European Convention on Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgments, see
Europ. T.S. No. 70, May 8, 1928. For a proposed convention on reciprocal enforcement, see EUROPEAN CoMMITTEE ON CRIME PROBLEMS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL VALIDrrY OF

(1970). See also EUROPEAN CoMMrrrFE ON CRIME PROBLEMS,
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL VALIDITY OF CRIMINAL
JUDGMENTS (1968).
For the Benelux Convention, see Convention Concerning Customs and Excise,
Sept. 5, 1952, Belgium-Luxembourg-Netherlands, 247 U.N.T.S. 329 (1956). See
also K. KRAELLE, LE BENELUx CoMMENTE, TExTEs OFFcmiLs 147, 209, 306 (1961);
De Schutter, International Criminal Cooperation-TheBenelux Example, in 2
TREATISE, supra,at 261. For a proposed convention on reciprocal enforcement, see
European Committee on Crime Problems.
The Scandinavian countries' arrangement for recognition and enforcement of
penal judgments is reproduced in H. GRUTZNER, INTERNATIONALER RECHTSHILFEVERKEHR IN STRAFSACHEN, pt. IV (1967). The arrangement between France and
CRIMINAL JUDGMENTs

certain African states is reproduced in 52
PRnrv 863 (1963).

REv. CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

252

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Vol. 11:249

extradition of offenders and mutual judicial assistance in obtaining witnesses and conducting investigations, is a significant factor
in the development of close international cooperation in penal
matters.
I.

TRANSFER OF OFFENDERS UNDER THE TREATIES AND UNITED
STATES IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION

The basic purpose of the treaties and the implementing legislation is to permit persons who are serving sentences in countries
other than their own to complete their sentences in their respective
countries. 7 In addition, the offense for which the offender has beeri
convicted and sentenced must also constitute an offense under the
laws of the receiving state. This provision embodies the "double
criminality" requirement so well established in extradition law
and practice.
To effect a transfer the "Transferring State" or "Sending State"
must first contact the offender's country of nationality, the
"Receiving State," and indicate its willingness to transfer the offender. Under the treaty with Canada, the offenders must initiate
the process by applying to the government of the Sending State for
a transfer. Under the Mexican Treaty, the government of the
Sending State initiates the process; however, the Treaty permits
offenders to send requests to the detaining government. Thereafter, the Receiving State indicates whether it is willing to accept
the transfer. Nothing in the treaties requires the contracting states
to accept an offender.
A proposed transfer is always subject to the consent of the
offender. The United States, under the implementing legislation,
will verify the consent of persons being transferred, either to or
from it, through a United States judicial officer.8 In the case of
transfers to the United States, a waiver must be secured from the
offender of any rights he or she may have to challenge the validity
of the foreign conviction and the sentence imposed by the foreign
court in United States courts. The verification of the waiver and
the offender's consent is subject to a right to counsel.'
The transfer is accomplished upon the receipt by the Receiving
7.

See Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, preface; S. REP. No. 435, 95th Cong.,

1st Sess. 9 (1977).
8. Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-144, § 4107(a), 91 Stat. 1212 (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4107(a)).
9. Id. §§ 4107(c), 4109 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4107(c), 4109).
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State of whatever documents it may require in order for it to execute the completion of the offender's sentence. The offender is then
delivered to the control of the Receiving State for the completion
of his or her sentence and is governed by the laws of the Receiving
State in all respects except for any matters pertaining to the conviction or sentence which are exclusively subject to the jurisdiction
of the Sending State. This jurisdictional dichotomy is in the two
treaties and the implementing legislation. Thus, the Sending State
retains jurisdiction over the conviction and sentence and the Receiving State has jurisdiction over the execution of the sentence
and all related matters. There is no treaty or legislative provision
for resolving possible jurisdictional conflicts, which will therefore
be subject to the forum's interpretation.
Should an action be initiated in a United States court seeking
to have the offender released, the court must first determine
whether it has jurisdiction to hear the matter and then consider
the jurisdictional division referred to above. This is immaterial
however where the suit challenges the constitutionality of either
the treaty or the implementing legislation or in the application to
the offender. In the latter case, the court would clearly have subject matter jurisdiction, even if the treaties and the legislation
purport to preclude such actions based on the offender's consent
to transfer and waiver to challenge the transfer. If a court orders
the release of the transferred offender, there would be no valid
basis for continued detention or supervision by United States authorities.
Although the treaties are silent on the point of releases prior to
completion of sentence, section 4114 of the implementing statute
provides for the return of such offenders to the Sending State.'
The statute creates a "return" mechanism separate and apart from
the process of extradition. The mechanism makes the return of
such offenders virtually automatic upon a request by the Sending
State.
If the request for return is processed as prescribed, the offender
may be able to challenge it in a United States court, and thereby
obtain a ruling on the validity of the return procedure. A favorable
decision would protect the offender from either detention by
United States authorities or return to the Sending State. An unfavorable decision would require return to be conditioned upon the
receipt of proper credit for time spent in United States custody.

10. Id. § 4114 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4114).
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The offender would then complete his or her sentence in the Sending State. It should be noted that, under section 4102 of the Act,
the Attorney General is empowered "to make regulations for the
proper implementation of such treaties." Thus, any future procedural developments would have to be examined in light of administrative regulations pursuant to this legislative delegation of
power.
III.

SUBSTANTIVE TRANSFER IssuEs

A.

Eligibility for Transfer

Transfer eligibility is governed by article II of the Mexican
Treaty, article II of the Canadian Treaty, as well as provisions of
the implementing legislation." The offense for which the offender
was convicted must be punishable in the Receiving State and cannot be a violation of immigration or military laws. With respect to
transfers with Mexico, under an extradition treaty of 189912 offenses cannot be deemed "political" in the sense of a "political offense
exception."' 3 No definition for a "political" offense, however, is
contained in the 1899 treaty.
1. Timing
Article II of both the Mexican and Canadian treaties provides
that no offender is to be transferred until any pending appeal or
collateral attack on the conviction or sentence is disposed of and
the time for appeal has elapsed. Additionally, there must remain
at least six months to the offender's sentence at the time of transfer.
Although on its face this statutory language appears to foreclose
any waiver of the right to appeal to secure eligibility at an earlier
date, it is possible that a judicial determination would construe
such a waiver as causing the time for appeal to elapse, and therefore allow the waiver. In this regard, a court may be influenced by
a number of policy considerations:
1. The humanitarian aspect of the treaties favors such
a construction, so that offenders whose offenses were
minor could take advantage of the treaties, even though
11.

Id. §§ 4103-4107 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4103-4107).

12. Treaty on Extradition, Feb. 22, 1899, United States-Mexico, 31 Stat. 1818,
T.S. 243, supplementary convention, Aug. 16, 1939, 55 Stat. 1133, T.S. 967.
13. See M. CHE BAssiouNi, supra note 4, at 368-429.
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the completion date of their sentence and the ending
date of the appeal period are less than six months apart.
2. None of the purposes of the treaties or interests protected by them would be jeopardized in any way by such
a construction. Principles of treaty interpretation encourage maximizing individual rights whenever treaty
language is susceptible of more than one interpretation. 4
3. The legislative history of the implementing statute
indicates that the question is open, since the enacted
language is silent on the subject.
2.

Relationship of the Offender to the States

Only offenders who are United States citizens or nationals
may be transferred to the United States and only citizens or nationals of a potential Receiving State may be transferred to that
country under 18 U.S.C. § 4100(b). This right is limited, however,
by article 11(2) and (3) of the Mexican Treaty, which provides for
transfer of offenders who are nationals of the Receiving State, but
not domiciliaries of the Sending State. A "domiciliary" is defined
in article IX of the Mexican Treaty as "a person who has been
present in the territory of one of the parties for at least five years
with an intent to remain permanently therein." As a result, American citizens who are domiciliaries of Mexico are ineligible for
transfer to the United States even though the implementing Act
makes no such distinctions. This exception could be deemed a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution, since there is no rational basis for
such discrimination within the same class of offenders. 5 By contrast, article 1(b) of the Canadian Treaty provides that transfer
of offenders between the two states shall apply to all their respective nationals and citizens and is therefore consistent with sections
4100(b) and 4102(6) of the implementing Act.
14. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924). See also S. ROSENNE,
THE LAW OF TREATms 214-19 (1970) (arts. 27, 28 of the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties and their legislative history).
15. See Implementation of Treaties for the Transfer of Offenders To or From
Foreign Countries: Hearingson H.R. 7148 Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenshipand InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 187-94 (1977) (statement of M. Cherif Bassiouni). Transfer
of Offenders and Administrationof ForeignPenalSentences: Hearingson S. 1682
Before the Subcomm. on Penitentiariesand Correctionsof the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 139-40 (1977) (statement of M. Cherif Bassiouni) [hereinafter cited as JudiciaryHearings].
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Both treaties by implication exclude permanent residents of the
United States who are not American citizens or nationals,'6 since
such persons are not entitled to diplomatic protection abroad
under traditional international law doctrine and practice. However, this does not address the issue of the applicability of United
States law to permanent residents who are not nationals in light
of United States Supreme Court decisions giving residents of the
United States substantially the same rights as United States citizens." Thus, a permanent resident of the United States who has
declared his or her intention to become a citizen, but has not yet
been sworn as a citizen and who is convicted of an offense while
vacationing in Canada or Mexico is ineligible for transfer to the
United States. This exclusion could be the basis of a challenge to
the constitutionality of the treaty and implementing statute on
equal protection grounds. The exclusion would also be in contravention of the underlying purposes of the treaties and implementing
statute as discussed above.
3. Minors
Persons under 18 years of age are eligible for transfer, provided
that a parent, a guardian, or the court having jurisdiction over the
offender consents to the transfer. The problem of waiver and consent to transfer by minors in this context is not unlike its counterpart in juvenile proceedings throughout the United States. The
United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of waiver
of constitutional rights by minors, parents, or guardians in juvenile
proceedings, but it is likely that some of the factors taken into
account by juvenile courts throughout the United States will be
relied upon. Among these factors, the most important is that the
waiver and consent, both linked in the process of effectuating the
transfer, may be deemed valid because of the benefits derived from
the waiver. This factor would be particularly relevant where the
parent, guardian, or court refuses to grant consent and thus deprives the minor of the benefit of transfer. Such a circumstance
would fly in the face of the rationale for the process.
16. "National" is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21), (22) (1970).
17.

A national is defined as a person owing permanent allegiance to the

United States, which excludes permanent residents who have no such status. Id.
Aliens are as entitled to equal protection as other "persons" who are United
States nationals. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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B.

Compliance with Transfer Requirements

The transfer procedures differ in the two treaties and should
be examined carefully to assess government compliance there8
with.'
1. Initiating the Transfer Process
Under the Mexican Treaty it is contemplated that transfers
of offenders from Mexico will generally be initiated by the Mexican
government. However, an express provision is made permitting
offenders to petition for consideration. Formal requirements for
such petitions will presumably be established by Mexican administrative measures, but in the absence any such guidance, it may
be possible to draft successful petitions by relying on the purposes
of the treaties, demonstrating how the transfer of the offender in
question would serve those purposes and detailing the offender's
eligibility for such transfer. Nevertheless, the transfer decision is
at Mexico's discretion.
The Canadian Treaty contemplates that offenders will make
application for transfer to the detaining state, which will then
transmit the applications to the Receiving State. In the United
States inquiries concerning application forms would be directed to
the Attorney General who is empowered to make regulations under
the Act.
Whether the first step is by application or by petition, the Transferring or Sending State is under no obligation to consent to the
transfer, nor is the potential Receiving State required to consent
to any proposed transfer. Accordingly, administrative intercession
in the respective states may be sought by the petitioning offender's
counsel, family or friends. The United States Attorney General has
indicated that all petitions and applications shall be entertained,
provided that they comply with the applicable treaties and legislation in force.
2.

Waiver Consent

The Canadian Treaty provides that offenders will be informed
of their right to apply for transfer. Consent of the offender is required by the Mexican Treaty as a precondition to transfer. This
18. Compare Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, arts. II, IV with Mexican
Treaty, supra note 1, arts. II, 11.
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precondition does not exist under the Canadian Treaty since the
process therein is initiated by offenders. Sections 4107 and 4108 of
the implementing statute require offenders to waive the right to
judicial review of their sentences or convictions in the Receiving
State's courts as a precondition to transfer to or from the United
States, and section 4108 further requires the appointment of a
magistrate to verify consent and waiver. In addition, section 4109
requires counsel to be made available to any offender consenting
and waiving rights pursuant to a transfer request. The United
States shall provide a federal public defender as counsel in cases
involving indigents. For United States detainees abroad the counsel of choice could be a United States or local attorney, but counsel
appointed under section 4109 should be an attorney licensed in the
United States.
3.

Transfer of Documents and Records

Under article IV of the Mexican and Canadian treaties, the
Transferring or Sending State must provide the Receiving State
with such documents or records as it may require to supervise
completion of an offender's sentence. Because transfer itself is discretionary with the states involved, if these materials are unavailable, a Receiving State may be prevented from accepting a proposed transfer. Although some of the information in such documents and records may be damaging to the offender, there will be
an opportunity to attack its reliability or admissibility in any
United States judicial proceeding. These materials may also contain other information beneficial to the offender.
C.
1.

Post-TransferIssues

Parole, Probation and Supervision

The implementing statute makes all matters relating to probation and parole subject to United States jurisdiction in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a). 9 Accordingly, whereas an offender
may have been ineligible for parole in Mexico or Canada, upon his
or her arrival in the United States, immediate eligibility for parole
is possible under section 4106. This grants transferees greater benefits than persons convicted under United States law. Under sections 4104 and 4106, transferred probationers and parolees shall be
19.

Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-144, § 4106, 91 Stat. 1212 (to be

codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4106).
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treated as if their conviction had been rendered by a United States
court, but presumably without the benefit of collateral attacks
upon the conviction.
2. Procedural Challenges
Any failure by the authorities of the state involved to follow
the requirements of the treaties, or by United States authorities to
follow the requirements of United States implementing legislation
may provide basis for an attack on the validity of an offender's
transfer and detention. If such an attack were made successfully
prior to the transfer, the offender would remain in the potential
Sending State. But if it were made after the transfer, there is a
chance that the offender would be released by the Receiving State.
Whether such a release would be followed by return of the offender
to the state of his or her conviction depends on the validity of the
"return" process.
3.

Waiver as a Bar to Judicial Challenges of Conviction
and Sentence

It may be contended that the offender's waiver of the right to
challenge the conviction or sentence in the courts of the Receiving
State which is made at the time of consent to transfer would act
as a bar to any form of collateral attack, including use of the writ
of habeas corpus. The concept of habeas corpus lies so close to the
roots of constitutional notions of due process that its elimination,
other than as provided under the President's emergency powers
under the Constitution,20 is unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny.
The validity of the waiver provided for under the implementing
statute is open to attack in at least three ways. First, the circumstances under which it was secured may negate a finding that it
was voluntarily given. The alternative to the waiver may be continued imprisonment in a foreign state, possibly under conditions
below certain humane standards. The imprisonment may be based
upon a conviction for a crime proven by serious human rights
violations. Such coercive circumstances would invalidate the
waiver.

2

20. The problems relating to rendering habeas corpus relief unavailable by
jurisdictional allocation or otherwise are discussed in authorities collected in

Note, ConstitutionalProblemsin the Execution of ForeignPenal Sentences: The
Mexican-American PrisonerTransfer Treaty, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1500, 1519 nn.53-

90 (1977).
21.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (for waiver of right to assistance
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Second, section 4108 of the implementing Act provides that the
offender must be informed of the exclusion of collateral attacks on
convictions or sentences in the Receiving State in order for his or
her consent to be valid. Accordingly, it could be deemed a bar
acknowledgement that the offender was consenting to the transfer
despite the possibility that no United States court would entertain
such a collateral attack and not a waiver of constitutional rights.
In any event such waiver and consent to transfer must be in the
presence of a United States judicial officer and with the advice of
counsel of the transferee's choice or appointed in cases of indigence. Courf-appointed counsel should be a licensed United States
attorney whose representation of the indigent transferee should not
be jeopardized by a conflict of interest in the event that appointed
counsel is a government attorney. Failure to follow such procedures
is subject to judicial review, and if the procedures are found to be
faulty, the offender shall be returned to the Sending State.
4.

Collateral Attack of Sentence or Conviction
The treaties expressly reserve jurisdiction over collateral attacks on convictions and sentences to the Sending or Transferring
State which imposed them.22 The transfer of custody of detainees
is premised on two assumptions: first, that a foreign penal judgment can be enforced in the United States, and second, that the
United States Constitution and criminal justice standards do not
apply extraterritorially. Both assumptions are, however, only partially justified in light of United States law and practice. It is
relevant in this context to note that the treaties with Mexico and
Canada are based upon these two premises and presume to preclude their judicial testing in the respective domestic courts by
prohibiting collateral attack on the conviction and sentence rendered abroad. The same limitations appear in the implementing
statutes of the three states.
(a) Recognition, Enforcement and Execution of Foreign
Judgment.-A distinction must be made between recognition, enof counsel); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1963) (where guilty plea operates
as waiver of rights against self-incrimination, to trial by jury and to confrontation
of witnesses); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963) (for waiver of right to habeas corpus relief); see M. CHnmE
BAssiouNi, supra note 5, at 376.
22. Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, art. V; Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art.
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forcement and execution of foreign judgments, 23 because historically the United States has held the position that it does not enforce foreign penal judgments.24 The "Full Faith and Credit"
clause of article IV of the United States Constitution does not even
require the enforcement of sister-state penal judgments. Foreign
penal judgments have nonetheless been given effect in the United
States. For example, the United States gives effect to a foreign
penal judgment under extradition procedures by relying on it to
execute the return of a person accused or convicted in a foreign
state. 25 Should the treaties on transfer of prisoners be merely an
administrative consequence of recognizing a foreign penal judgment, then the scheme finds strong support in the long-established
practice of extradition. It must also be noted, however, that if such
an interpretation is not given to the scheme and United States
courts should consider the treaties to be a form of enforcement of
foreign penal judgments, some precedent exists for that approach.
These precedents include the enforcement in the United States of
penal sanctions imposed by foreign consular officers, 2 the enforcement of status of forces agreements, particularly the agreement
between the United States and the Republic of Korea on the status
23. See Penal Treaties with Mexico and Canada:Hearingson Ex. D and Ex.
H Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 262-65
(1977) (statement of M. Cherif Bassiouni).
24. In The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825), Chief Justice Marshall declared: "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." It
may be noted that the penal sentences involved in the Mexican and Canadian
treaties do not include fines or criminal sanctions other than restraints on liberty,
confinement, probation, parole, and some forms of supervision. But see Cooley
v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1975) (Iranian conviction for the murder
of a woman's spouse was given legal effect in the context of determining her
eligibility to receive social security benefits). See also Foran-Rogers, Recognition
of Foreign Countries'PenalJudgments, GLOBE, voL. 14, no. 6, at 1-7 (Illinois State
Bar Association Newsletter 1977).
25. See M. CHEm BASsIOUNI, supra note 4, at 27-78, 502-57. See also United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
26. See Gordon B. Baldwin, Department of State, Report on Prisoner
Exchange Agreements (July 20, 1976) (unpublished), who refers to various United
States precedents on the enforcement of foreign criminal penalties such as § 5 of
the Service Courts of Friendly Forces Act. Act of June 30, 1944, c. 326, 58 Stat.
644, (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 705 (1970)), which authorizes confinement in Federal
facilities of persons serving sentences imposed by foreign courts-martial.
Baldwin also refers to the enforcement in the United States of criminal sanctions
imposed by the foreign consular officers under 22 U.S.C. §§ 256-258a (1970).
Sections 256-258a were upheld in Dallemagne v. Moisan, 197 U.S. 169 (1905),
thus providing a precedent for enforcement of foreign final judgments.
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of United States armed forces in Korea, 2" and recent case law de8
velopments in giving judicial effect to foreign penal judgment.2
(b) United States Public Policy in Minimum Standards of
CriminalJustice and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Penal Judgments and the Execution of Foreign Penal
Sentences.-It is a well-settled principle of private international
law that no state shall recognize or enforce the judgments of other
states if they are contrary to the public policy of the recognizing
or enforcing state.2 ' The question therefore arises whether certain
minimum standards of criminal justice as embodied in the meaning of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution and those specific rights enunciated in
the Bill of Rights which have been incorporated in the due process
clause, must be observed in the process leading to the recognition,
enforcement or execution of a foreign penal judgment which the
United States will recognize, enforce, or execute. Nothing in the
Constitution requires that only systems of criminal justice which
are similar to that of the United States be given recognition. In
fact, the position of the United States Supreme Court on extradition" and on the constitutionality of status of forces agreements"
has been to respect other criminal justice systems even though
they may be very different from that of the United States. Nevertheless, contrary to established jurisprudence, there are some indications that certain constitutional protections may be held applicable extraterritorially whenever United States agents abroad
engage in behavior which is violative of certain constitutional
principles.' Therefore inquiry should be made into the facts
27.

July 9, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1677, T.I.A.S. No. 6127.

28.

See Cooley v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d 1151.

29. See 2 A. EHRENZWEIG & E.

JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 81-83
(1973); H. GOODRICH & E. ScoLEs, CONFLICT OF LAws 14-15 (9th ed. 1964); L.
STIMSON, CONFLICT OF CmMINAL LAws 20-25 (1936); Paulsen & Sovern, "Public
Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956). Cf. Huntington v.
Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) (enforcement between domestic states); Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (Puerto Rico) v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 203 N.E.2d 210, 254
N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964) (enforcement of gambling debt incurred in Puerto Rico).

30.

See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).

31.

See, e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S.

487 (1956), rev'd on rehearing,S54 U.S. 1 (1957); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211

(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972); Coker, The Status of Visiting
Military Forces in Europe: NATO-SOFA, A Comparison, in 2 TREATISE, supra
note 6, at 115.
32.

Traditionally the United States has accepted the fact that in personam

jurisdiction secured by fraud or force is recognizable by the courts. Frisbie v.
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upon which the conviction was based to find out to what extent a
United States agent may have been involved in practices which are
patently offensive to due process standards.
On its face, there is nothing in the criminal justice system of
Canada which would warrant a finding that it is incompatible with
the public policy of minimum criminal justice standards of the
United States. 3 However, Mexico's criminal justice system represents a greater variation from that of the United States than Canada's. Nevertheless, the Mexican system of criminal justice theoretically offers certain minimum guarantees which make it somewhat compatible with the criminal justice standards of the United
States. That system affords an accused the right to be adequately
informed of the charges, the right to counsel, the right to open and
public hearings conducted by an impartial judge, the right to com4
petent testimony in determining guilt and the right to appeal.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Recently, however, there are indications that if illegal conduct is performed by a United States

agent abroad, it could be the basis of the application of the exclusionary rule if
the conduct is patently offensive to due process. See United States v. Toscanino,
500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). The holding in Toscanino was subsequently limited
in U.S. ex rel. Luian v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1001 (1975); and United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 847 (1975). See generally Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular
Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25
(1973), reprintedin M. CHFxw BAsoUNI, supra note 4, at 121-291. On the question of territorial application of United States law, see The Exchange, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116 (1812); 6 M. Wmm!jm, DIGEST OF INTERNAToNAL LAw 889-904
(1968); Bassiouni, Theories of Jurisdictionand Their Application in Extradition
Law and Practice,5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1974); Feller, Jurisdictionover Offenses
with a Foreign Element, in 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at 5; George, ExtraterritorialApplication of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. Rnv. 609 (1966).
33. P. BOLTON, PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE INCANADIAN CRIINAL TRIALS (1974);
A. HOOPER, CASES AND MATERIAL ON CANADIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1974); A.
POPPLE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE MANUAL (1956); R. SALHANY, CANADIAN CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1972).
34. Miller, Mexican Jails and American Prisoners,51 Los ANGELES B.J. 439,
442-43 (1976); and G. Sanchez, DERECHO MEXICANO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS PENALES
(4th ed. 1977). All constitutional guarantees of the CONSTIrUCION POLIrCA DE LOS
EsTADos UNIDOS MIucANos are expressly made applicable to foreigners by article
33 of the document. The guarantees relevant here include:
Art. 14-Prosecution must occur before previously established tribunals in
which the essential formalities of procedure shall be complied with in conformance with laws then in effect.
Art. 16-Arrest orders will be issued only by competent judicial authority
upon a complaint supported by an affidavit of a reliable person, except
when the crime occurs in the presence of a detaining officer.

264

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:249

Thus, at least on its face, the criminal justice system of Mexico
does not patently violate the public policy of the United States.
There is, however, a public policy in the United States with
respect to minimum standards of criminal justice as applied. The
execution of a foreign penal sentence rendered on the basis of violations of such standards would warrant the denial of execution of
such judgments. Such issues can only be determined on an ad hoc
basis, however, since the denial of such minimum standards to a
given individual would depend upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. It is very unlikely that the United States Supreme
Court would hold the treaties to be unconstitutional on the
grounds that they purport to execute the penal sentences of a
foreign state whose minimum criminal justice standards are not
patently offensive per se to United States standards. What the
United States courts are more likely to consider is whether on an
ad hoc basis the foreign conviction of an American citizen transferred to the United States under the terms of the treaties for
execution of a sentence has been secured in a manner so patently
offensive to United States minimum standards of criminal justice
that the further detention of such a person by the United States
would be contrary to its public policy. Thus, the concern should
not be over the constitutionality of the treaties, but over the criteria of minimum standards of criminal justice which the United
States Supreme Court would hold to be applicable to American
citizens abroad as a condition to the use of the power processes of
this country to execute the sentence of a foreign penal judgment.
Art. 19-No detention may exceed three days unless there is a formal judicial order stating the crime alleged and its elements, and establishing a
prima facie showing of responsibility.
Art. 20(I)-The accused may not be compelled to testify against himself
nor held incommunicado for the purpose of coercion.
Art. 20(m)-The accused shall be told in a public hearing within 48 hours
of formal detention the name of his accuser and the nature of the charges.
Art. 20(IV)-The accused has a right to confront and cross examine witnesses against him.
Art. 20(V)-An accused may call his own witnesses and is entitled to court
assistance in procuring them.
Art. 20(VI)-The accused is entitled to a public trial by a judge or a jury
of his peers if the sentence faced is more than one year in prison.
Art. 20(IX)-The accused has the right to be represented by counsel of his

choice or by public defender.
Art. 20(X)-Time served prior to sentencing is subtracted from the sent-

ence.
Art. 22-Excessive and unusual penalties are forbidden.
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United States courts would have to inquire into the facts support-

ing the foreign conviction, which would entail recognition of a right
to make a collateral attack on the conviction in habeas corpus
proceedings. Such collateral attack is ostensibly barred by the
treaties and the implementing act as discussed above. This preclusion as set forth in provisions of both the treaties and the implementing statute is likely to be held unconstitutional, unless the
courts interpret the provisions in such a broad manner that collateral attacks fall within the scope of the provisions.
The waiver of the rights to collaterally attack the conviction
which is specified in the treaties35 will of course be raised by the
government of the Sending State whenever a transferred offender
would seek to attack the validity of his or her foreign conviction
in a United States court. There is some authority to the effect that
such a waiver, when done knowingly and intelligently" in the presence of a United States magistrate, is constitutionally valid when
made with the assistance of counsel and in order to gain certain
benefits otherwise not available." A court may hold that such a
waiver was not freely given because an offender was in detention
at the time of making the waiver. However, the existence of such
conditions, as well as the coercive effect on the waiver of the transferred offender, will have to be proven and therefore will be determined necessarily on an ad hoc basis.
In the United States, habeas corpus proceedings would require
at a minimum that the American detaining authority demonstrate
the applicability of the treaty and implementing statute to the
offender, and that the scope of inquiry could by some rational
extrapolation be extended to the basis for the offender's conviction
and sentence. Success at this stage would result in the release of
the offender, but it would also result in the government's attempt
to return the released offender to the Transferring or Sending
State.
5. Return of Released Offenders
The implementing statute purports to create a mechanism
that would operate speedily and smoothly to return transferred
offenders released by United States courts before their sentences
35.
36.
37.

See note 22 supra.
See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
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are completed to the state that convicted and sentenced them.U
On its face, this provision would appear to render attacks on the
validity of transfer or collateral attacks on conviction and sentence
useless, since success in such attacks would merely result in return
of the offender to the state from whence he or she came. The
validity of section 4114 is questionable, however. To examine its
validity the provision should be considered in relation to extradition as that practice is followed in all three treaty signatory states.
Extradition under the United States-Mexico and the United
States-Canada treaties of extradition requires not only that the
offense for which the relator is sought be criminal in both states
(double criminality), but also that it be among those offenses expressly listed in the Extradition Treaty.39 The treaties on transfer
of prisoners, however, permit transfer whenever the offense in
question is criminal in both states, regardless of whether it is listed
in any tr eaty as an extraditable offense. Thus, the possibility exists
under section 4114 of the Act that an offender could be returned
for an offense which is not among those listed in the extradition
treaty between the parties. While a state may make a request for
extradition at any time, under section 4114, the request for return
must be made within six months of the offender's release. Finally,
as a precondition to extradition, federal law requires that probable
cause be shown in a hearing." That is, it must be shown that there
is sufficient evidence of the offender's guilt of the crime in question
as would justify holding him for trial under United States law. '
Under section 4114, it is sufficient to produce a certified copy of
the conviction rendered by the court of the state seeking the offender's return. Should a United States court find that such
"return" procedures are merely a form of extradition under another label, it may consider that section 4114 discriminates against
returnees as opposed to extraditees who are governed by sections
3181 et seq. without any rational basis and consider that provision
38.

Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-144, § 4114, 91 Stat. 1212 (to be

codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4114).
39. Treaty of Extradition, Feb. 22, 1899, United States-Mexico, art. 1",31
Stat. 1818, T.S. No. 242; Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, United StatesGreat Britain, art. X, 8 Stat. 572, T.S. 119, supplementary convention, July 12,
1889, art. I, 26 Stat. 1508, T.S. 139; see 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976). See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)
(reasonableness of probable cause); Brinnegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160

(1949) (definition of probable cause); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(distinction between probable cause and proof of guilt).
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a denial of equal protection.4 2
Probable cause as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3184 for extradition
may be deemed inapplicable to "return" procedures under section
4114 because, in this case, the return is predicated on a conviction
rather than an accusation. If, however, the release was due to a
finding by the releasing United States court that the conviction
was in violation of minimum criminal justice standards, the question remains how another United States court could rely on the
validity of that judgment to order the offender's return. Should the
Sending State request extradition of the transferred offender
rather than requesting his or her return under section 4114, the
Requesting State would have to meet a variety of requirements not
included in the simple return mechanism of section 4114. Therefore, release without return is a possibility.
6.

Civil Disabilities and Record Expungement

Section 4112 of the Act provides that a person may suffer only
such losses and disqualification as "would result from the fact of
the conviction in the foreign country." The purpose of this provision is to eliminate disabilities, but neither the treaties nor the
statute provides for expungement of records of transferred offenders. This is a serious problem in the United States because such
persons would have a United States detention record based on a
foreign conviction without the right of expungement which might
have been available had the conviction been rendered by a United
States court. The possible judicial outcome is uncertain of an action for expungement of records brought under the Act as presently
written. The court could apply all relevant provisions on expungement to such records by analogy without the need for specific
legislation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The scheme for the transfer of offenders is a laudable step
which should be supported by the bench and bar. Its procedures
42. On denial of equal protection for an unjustified discriminatory reason see
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (interference
with rights to food stamps); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to
travel interstate); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (interference with
privacy and autonomy). The compelling state interest standard is characterized
in Printing Indus. of Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F. Supp. 801, 808-09 (S.D. Tex. 1974),
vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 937 (1975); Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St.2d
155, 160-61, 291 N.E.2d 530, 534 (1972).
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should be the subject of careful scrutiny and the creative talents
of defense lawyers should find a fertile field in the representation
of United States offenders held in Mexico and Canada and transferred to the United States, as well as Canadian and Mexican
offenders held in the United States." The success of this experiment may encourage similar arrangements with other countries."
It is hoped that the zeal of lawyers and judges will not result in
destruction of the effectiveness of this scheme and turn it into a
disguised mechanism for "springing" United States citizens who
have committed crimes abroad. If that should be the case, the
whole process will be jeopardized and a heavy price will be paid
in terms of diplomatic repercussions and loss of opportunities for
transfer for future offenders.
43. The right to counsel of choice or court appointed counsel is provided for
in section 4109 and is, of course, subject to applicable United States laws and
Supreme Court decisions. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon
v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937)
(choice or waiver of counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (choice or
waiver of counsel); Fitzgerald v. Estell, 505 F.2d 1534 (5th Cir. 1974) (effectiveness of counsel), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1976),
44. Negotiations are presently being conducted with Bolivia.

